AN ANALYSIS OF AFRICA COMMAND'S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE On 11 July, 2009 President Barrack Obama laid out his vision for U.S. efforts in
Africa during a speech in Ghana -"I will focus on four areas that are critical to the future of Africa and the entire developing world: democracy; opportunity; health; and peaceful resolution to conflict." 1 The U.S military organization with geographic responsibility for Africa is U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). An examination of AFRICOM's organization and tasks is appropriate given its recent stand-up and our growing interests in the region. The goal of this paper is to explore AFRICOM's organizational structure with an eye for improvements by utilizing contemporary organizational theory.
The question this paper seeks to answer is "can AFRICOM be better structured to accomplish its mission?" We will answer this question by examining the environment that AFRICOM seeks to influence, the tasks that AFRICOM must conduct to complete its mission and the organizations it must work with to succeed. 3 reflecting the increasing importance of Africa to the U.S. both as an economic partner (up to 25% of U.S. oil will be imported from Africa by 2015) 4 and as a potential security threat (ungoverned/under-governed regions enable terrorist and criminal activity). Additionally, the U.S. Government has a compelling moral interest in reducing the suffering of Africans threatened by starvation and violence, and avoiding incidents of large scale genocide such as 1994's Rwanda. Furthermore, U.S. interests in Africa are constantly evolving and likely to intensify. As Africa develops, her countries will become valued business partners for those states fortunate enough to have well established trade relationships in the region. Thus, the summation of these effects makes a compelling argument for characterizing U.S. national interests in Africa as important and growing. 5 AFRICOM is unique among geographic combatant commands in that it was envisioned to be a command focused on theater security cooperation and capacity
building. This mission emphasis is clearly delineated in the December 2008 Unified
Command Plan -"building partner operational and institutional capacity at the country and regional levels, and, when appropriate, supporting the efforts of other U.S.
government agencies active in the AOR." 6 
Environment
This mission emphasis recognizes the essential challenges associated with U.S. interests in Africa -namely, that many subSaharan countries are politically unstable, that sizeable areas of many African countries are ungoverned or under-governed, and that past efforts and partnerships have been largely ineffective in resolving these challenges. Consequently, to realize President Obama's vision, AFRICOM's structure should be adapted to address the region's unique governmental, cultural and demographic characteristics.
Africa, as a region, is cursed by a range of complex and negative traits. These traits can be divided into those that directly impact AFRICOM (i.e. those that influence military professionalism or result in traditional military missions) and traits that engender conflict. The chief trait that AFRICOM's structure must account for is Africa's widespread lack of "good governance. Correspondingly, AFRICOM should be structured to effectively collaborate with the U.S.
agencies (whole of government approach) and other organizations that impact the African environment.
Roles of U.S. Governmental Agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations and the United Nations
The whole of government approach is defined as "an approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal." 17 The scope, complexity and severity of African challenges highlighted in the background section of this paper coupled with President Obama's focus areas (democracy; opportunity; health; and the peaceful resolution of conflict) 18 Establishing broad policy and priorities for regional engagement (i.e. "strategic alignment") will address a recurring problem for U.S. initiatives in Africa. Historically, U.S. efforts have been disjointed and ill-coordinated -"the major problem with attempting to reach these objectives in Africa is that efforts are usually not mutually planners, other inter-agency representatives and over 20 African countries. 21 This collaborative planning process is almost identical to the models of ideal espoused in current organization theory. 22 Contemporary organization theory proposes such a "strategic management"
relationship between collaborating organizations. 23 Such an arrangement could prevent embarrassing or ill-conceived initiatives for AFRICOM. For example, AFRICOM was criticized for including Gabonese military forces in Operation Endeavor, a twenty-two nation interoperability and communications exercise, despite the alleged election fraud and violence that followed Gabon's August 2009 election.
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One approach to achieving "strategic alignment" is to employ a senior State . Therefore, military operations (typically logistics for humanitarian assistance) conducted in support of USAID will be managed by a skeletal USAID staff. Currently AFRICOM has one USAID representative on staff.
Given USAID's limited manpower, the current organizational relationship is appropriate.
Nevertheless, the geographic mismatch between AFRICOM, USAID and the State Department will complicate coordination as illustrated by the following anecdote: Navy did deliver supplies to Liberia on behalf of Project Hope. 40 Historically, the United Nations (UN) has been the organization of choice for African intervention with 19 successful peacekeeping missions completed.
NGOs may be most receptive to AFRICOM involvement if AFRICOM's outreach representatives are civilians thereby limiting the appearance of "militarization" of humanitarian efforts and promoting the perception of impartiality and neutrality for NGO workers. 41 The UN currently has seven peacekeeping missions in Africa totaling nearly 60,000 military troops (MINURSO, MONUC, UNMIL, UNOCI, UNMIS, UNAMID, MINURCAT, and BINUB). 42 One negative aspect of UN peacekeeping missions is their lack of timeliness -"based on past experience (notably in 1994 in Rwanda) … time is of the essence if one is to prevent an emerging crisis from degenerating into a catastrophe. Under the UN peacekeeping structure, it takes on average three to six months from the time the UN Security Council decides to establish a peacekeeping mission until it is able to deploy such a mission. During this time period, lives may be lost while the conflict escalates and spills over into neighboring regions." 43 Currently, the U.S. contributes troops to two of these missions (UNMIL and MINURCAT). AFRICOM planners and intelligence personnel will need to build strong relationships with UN planners in order to harmonize operations and coordinate efforts. Given the nature of peacekeeping operations and the likelihood of additional instability, AFRICOM will need to keep close tabs on peacekeeping missions. At present, AFRICOM has no observers on staff on any of these peacekeeping missions. 44 The Role of the African Union and Regional Economic Communities Consideration should be given to placing an observer on staff at each peacekeeping mission and the Africa division of the UN Peacekeeping staff.
Another important partner for AFRICOM is the African Union (AU). The AU is an especially relevant actor due to its legitimacy among the African people. The AU was conceived and founded by Africans as an organization focused on solving Africa's problems. The AU is modeled on the UN and is currently the only continent-wide organization capable of addressing wide-scale concerns. Of note, Morocco is not a member of the African Union.
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The AU is a successor to the now defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU) and has a significantly different vision than its predecessor. Whereas the OAU was focused on promoting unity among African nations and the principle of non-interference, the AU is focused on the economic and social advancement of Africans and the principle of non-indifference (a direct outcome of the Rwandan genocide). 46 In keeping with these principles, the AU recognizes the importance of military support as evinced in the AU vision statement: "As a continental organization it focuses on the promotion of peace, security and stability on the continent as a prerequisite for the implementation of the development and integration agenda of the Union." This directorate conducts current operations and plans for near term operations.
Ongoing operations are conducted by several divisions within the O&L directorate (i.e.
the current operations, logistics, anti-terrorism and information operations divisions).
These divisions require flexibility and agility in the form of decision making authority and the permission to coordinate with partners in order to deal with events as they unfold.
The SP&P directorate conducts extensive internal coordination with the IKD, Operations & Logistics and
Resources directorates. The internal relationship between the IKD and SP&P directorates needs to be especially robust given the long-term perspective of the SP&P in order to enable refinement and adjustment of SP&P plans. 57 The O&L directorate is functionally aligned to include medical and engineering divisions in addition to the aforementioned divisions. The O&L directorate is, in essence, the AFRICOM section that directs component command forces in the field -AFRICOM's commander considers the O&L directorate to be the locus of effort for executing ongoing operations. 58 One significant difficulty that AFRICOM faces within its organization is the dearth of inter-agency civilians. Initially, AFRICOM had planned for 125 inter-agency civilian positions but later cut that goal down to 52. 59 This reduced goal has not yet been achieved with only 25 inter-agency civilians on board as of 31 December 2009 (less than 3% of AFRICOM Headquarters staff). 60 Clearly, the inter-agency synergy built into the original AFRICOM organizational plan has failed to materialize. It is unlikely that AFRICOM can attain more inter-agency civilians due to severe manning shortfalls within these agencies (DoS has a 25% shortfall in mid-level managers). 61 Organizational Theory
With AFRICOM's basic organization and civilian manning examined, it is appropriate to investigate
Organizational theory and its applications to AFRICOM.
This paper seeks to investigate AFRICOM's organizational design in terms of two separate but interrelated concepts -internal organizational design and external environment. First, internal organizational design and its applications to AFRICOM will be examined. Next, external organizational theory, will be explored as it applies to AFRICOM's environment and partnerships.
Contemporary business theory classifies internal organization structure into three groupings that are relevant to AFRICOM -functional, divisional and horizontal. and non-state actors. GCC's, however, require stable and well defined relationships with international and inter-agency partners for optimal effectiveness. Therefore, the best possible organizational structure for AFRICOM balances the need for established supra-governmental, non-governmental and inter-agency relationships (to develop long term strategic effect) with the need for adaptability in the complex and evolving AFRICAN environment (to achieve near-term objectives).
Organizations that are optimized for stable environments and efficient performance fall under the "mechanical system" paradigm. 65 Characteristics of these types of organizations include a well defined vertical structure, rigid cultures, formal systems and routine tasks. Military units are classic examples of mechanical systemsthe clearly defined hierarchies, authorities and processes ensure alignment of effort and facilitate interoperability. Thus, AFRICOM's relationships with supra-ordinate and subordinate commands should predominately follow the mechanical system paradigm.
As stated previously, AFRICOM's relationship with its inter-agency partners requires stability and formal processes that would be best served by this type of system. The planning for, and management of, long-term TSC and BPC initiatives are AFRICOM (and inter-agency) functions best suited for the "mechanical systems" model. AFRICOM's relationship with USAID and the State Department (to include the CRC) will benefit from the clearly defined authorities, processes and relationships that "mechanical systems" produce. The IKD directorate is properly organized as a "mechanical system" based on its requirement to have a well defined and developed information gathering process. Additionally, AFRICOM's Outreach and SP&P directorates are appropriately configured as "mechanical systems" since they serve as the principal inter-agency, IGO and NGO coordination elements.
The "natural system" paradigm falls on the other extreme of organizational theory. Natural systems are optimized for turbulent environments and are considered to be "learning organizations." 66 Characteristics of "natural systems" include horizontal structures, empowered roles, shared information, collaborative strategies and adaptive cultures. As elaborated in the background section of this paper, Africa is a highly complex and volatile environment -AFRICOM's organization should reflect that reality.
To be successful, these elements must adjust to the evolving African environment through creativity and adaptability -"To cope, organizations need a shift to a new paradigm....shifting to flexible, decentralized structures that emphasize horizontal collaboration." 67 Therefore, the elements within AFRICOM responsible for immediate and near term shaping activities are best served by the "natural system" paradigm -in essence executing the plans and programs coordinated and developed by the Recommendations and findings determined in this paper are summarized below in bullet format:
• A major task that AFRICOM will need to assume is the "professionalization" of African militaries.
• AFRICOM's resource constrained "professionalization" efforts should be directed towards the leadership of African militaries.
• To best effect "professionalization" AFRICOM should be organized to seek and support frequent multi-national military exercises and liaison opportunities.
• AFRICOM should utilize the State Department to introduce major TSC, BPC and humanitarian assistance initiatives.
• AFRICOM should consider developing an African regional engagement plan in tandem with the State Department.
• Requests for military assistance generated by African governments should be routed through embassies/consulates to prevent a perceived "militarization" of foreign policy -provided that embassies/consulates have the capacity to support the workload.
• AFRICOM should utilize inter-agency civilians, if available, for NGO outreach and coordination.
• AFRICOM should consider placing observers on staff at UN peacekeeping mission in Africa.
• AFRICOM should consider placing liaison officers at each African Standby Force Headquarters once presidential determinations support such connections.
• AFRICOM should seek formal commitments from its inter-agency partners for personnel or develop other methods to obtain inter-agency perspectives if inter-agency personnel are not on staff due to resource constraints.
• AFRICOM should pursue a common facility to enhance coordination among geographically separated directorates.
• AFRICOM's Operations and logistics directorate (current operations, future operations, information operations and logistics divisions only) would benefit from geography based re-organization tied to African Standby forces.
• AFRICOM's Operations and logistics directorate's hierarchy should be "flattened" to the maximum extent possible and a prudent expansion of decision making authorities and coordination permissions should be considered.
Conclusion
Africa is a complex and dynamic environment fraught with overwhelming challenges for its constituent nations. AFRICOM was launched to shape the African environment in order to promote stability and protect the U.S. government's important and growing regional interests. To accomplish these missions, AFRICOM developed an innovative, non-traditional, headquarters organization designed to improve coordination with its inter-agency, IGO, NGO and regional governmental partners. This paper evaluated AFRICOM's organizational structure seeking to answer the question "Is AFRICOM optimally organized for its mission and environment?" in light of contemporary organization theory.
AFRICOM's mission is to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy. To accomplish its mission AFRICOM must conduct TSC and BPC activities in coordination with inter-agency and regional partners. These activities include military exercises, liaison opportunities, and mil to mil exchanges that provide valuable opportunities to "professionalize" African militaries. Additionally, the ailing African environment dictates that AFRICOM must conduct significant HA/DR missions.
AFRICOM's mission success, in turn, depends heavily on its many partnerships.
Key interagency partnerships include the DoS and US AID. Effective collaboration with these two agencies is critical for the U.S.'s "Diplomacy, Development and Defense" approach in Africa. The UN, AU and NGOs are other partners that AFRICOM must engage for success in Africa. This paper concludes that AFRICOM's organizational structure is generally suited for inter-agency and partner coordination, however AFRICOM is not structured for near term operations in Africa's dynamic and diverse environment.
A review of AFRICOM's directorate reveals that the Outreach, IKD and Strategy
Plans and Policy Directorates are appropriately configured for their organizational roles.
The O & L directorate, however, is not optimally organized for its role. Although it is appropriately configured as a divisionally grouped, "natural system" two small reorganizations could improve its theoretical effectiveness. The first reorganization would be to group the current operations, future operations, information operations and logistics divisions together and have them report directly to the director for Operations and Logistics. Additionally, each of these divisions should be further divided into branches that correspond to the African Standby forces. These two reorganizations will improve AFRICOM's ability to plan for and respond to current and near-future operations.
AFRICOM's was organized to facilitate inter-agency and other partnerships..
Evaluation of AFRICOM's structure based on contemporary organizational theory reveals that AFRICOM is generally structured properly to accomplish its mission.
AFRICOM can benefit however, from some minor reorganization and the strengthening of some collaborative relationships. These small changes, which will properly balance the mechanistic and natural system approaches to AFRICOM's organizational structure, have the potential to greatly increase AFRICOM's overall mission accomplishment
